Why do People Stay? Insider Advantages and Immobility by Fischer, Peter A. et al.










Hamburg Institute of International Economics
2000
ISSN 1616-4814The HWWA is a member of:
•   Wissenschaftsgemeinschaft Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (WGL)
•   Arbeitsgemeinschaft deutscher wirtschaftswissenschaftlicher Forschungsinstitute (ARGE)











Hamburg Institute of International Economics
Öffentlichkeitsarbeit
Neuer Jungfernstieg 21  −   20347 Hamburg
Telefon:   040/428 34 355




Hamburg Institute of Internatinal Economics
Europa-Kolleg Hamburg
CEPR London
Telefon:   040/428 34 350
Telefax:   040/428 34 529
e-mail: straubhaar@hwwa.de
Einar Holm, Gunnar Malmberg
Department of Social and Economic Geography
University of Umeå, Schweden
Tel.:   (4690) 786 5495




Economics Editor – Wirtschaftsredaktion
Neue Zürcher Zeitung
Tel.:   0041 1 258 1111/1086





2. Explaining (im)mobility 8
3 The Model and Data 13
3.1 The Model 13
3.2 The Data 15
4 Determinants of Immobility: Estimation Results 17
4.1 Duration and socio-economic Characteristics Matter 17
4.2 Poor Performance of Regional Macro Variables 25
4.3 Life-course Specificity and the Labour Market 26
4.4 Place of Birth and Occupation make little Difference 29
4.5 Group-specific Heterogeneity 30




The low mobility of people in Europe is considered a problem for adjustment to
asymmetric shocks and regional convergence in the European Monetary Union. We
suggest a complement to the traditional migration theories, the insider advantages
approach to explain why most Europeans prefer to stay. Staying immobile they have
accumulated work- and leisure-oriented insider advantages that are location-specific and
would be lost in the case of emigration. Therefore, the longer people have stayed -and
the more insider advantages they have accumulated-, the less likely they are to move.
Using a new micro dataset covering all people resident in Sweden in 1994 and their
mobility experience since 1985, we find a strong positive duration dependence of the
probability to stay. Traditional micro-economic characteristics prove helpful in
explaining immobility, while regional macro-economic differences have surprisingly
little impact on individual mobility decisions. A large proportion of the moves between
Swedish labour markets seem to be related to specific life-course events rather than to
pure labour market issues.
Zusammenfassung
Wieso ist die Mobilit￿t der Arbeitskr￿fte innerhalb der Europ￿ischen Union ￿ aller
Freiz￿gigkeit zum Trotz ￿ so gering? Traditionelle Theorieans￿tze verm￿gen die
schwach ausgepr￿gte Wanderungsintensit￿t der EU-Angeh￿rigen nur begrenzt zu er-
kl￿ren. Denn eigentlich sollten die teilweise betr￿chtlichen Einkommens- und
Besch￿ftigungsunterschiede zu weit mehr Migration innerhalb der EU f￿hren. In diesem
Diskussionspapier entwickeln wir eine Idee, die sehr wohl zu erkl￿ren vermag, weshalb
f￿r die meisten Menschen ￿stehen￿ die bessere Alternative als ￿gehen￿ ist. Der Insider-
Ansatz macht deutlich, weshalb f￿r die individuelle Entscheidung eine grenz- und
kulturraum￿berschreitende Wanderung die Ausnahme  und nicht die Regel ist. Die
empirische ￿berpr￿fung mit Hilfe eines neuen origin￿ren Mikro-Datensets, das die
gesamte schwedische Wohnbev￿lkerung enth￿lt, best￿tigt die These, dass die Verweil-
dauer einen direkten positiven Einfluss auf die Verharrenswahrscheinlichkeit aus￿bt.
Wer lange an einem Ort lebt, wird immer wahrscheinlicher an diesem Ort bleiben!
JEL-codes: F22, J60, R237
1.  IntroductionΗ
In the recently introduced European Monetary Union (EMU) it is no longer possible to
react to asymmetric macroeconomic shocks with exchange rate changes. Instead, the
necessary adjustments have to take place through (real) price and labour market
flexibility or mechanisms of interregional and international transfers.
Compared to the United States, Europe is characterised by comparatively low rates of
mobility of people. As a crude rule of thumb, international emigration propensities in
Europe  have been around or below 0.5 per cent of population. For 1990-95, Obstfeld
and Peri (1998) report average annual internal net migration rates of 0.31 for Germany
and 0.2 for the UK, as opposed to 0.87 for the USA. Blanchard and Katz (1992) showed
that between the different States of America migration has played an important role in
balancing out temporary regional labour market effects. They find, that ￿a decrease in
employment of 1 worker in the initial years is associated with an increase in
unemployment of 0.3 workers, a decrease in participation of 0.05 workers, and thus an
implied increase in net outmigration of 0.65 workers￿ (Blanchard and Katz 1992:34).
Decressin and Fatas (1994) have demonstrated that in Europe the main adjustment to
regional labour demand shocks happens through changes in labour market participation
rates. Eichengreen (1993) estimates the elasticity of migration on regional wage
differentials to be 25 times higher in the US than in Britain. For the Southern European
countries Italy and Spain this difference will be even higher (see Faini et al. 1997 for
Italy and Bentolila and Jimeno 1995 for Spain).
The relatively low mobility of people within Europe has raised concerns about the
economic effects of EMU (see Obstfeld and Peri 1998). It has stimulated discussion
about the causes of immobility. Traditional migration theory has been quite successful
in explaining causes and consequences of international and internal migration. Less
clear it is, however, why most people do not move, despite persistent aggregate regional
wage differentials. Traditional migration theories introduce pecuniary transport and
transaction costs to explain immobility (for a review see  e.g. Greenwood 1993, 1997).
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Other standard explanations include institutional obstacles, risk adversity and the
￿option value of waiting￿ (Burda, 1995). But while transport and transaction costs have
been falling and progress has been made in the European Union to remove obstacles to
migration, in many European countries internal migration rates have had a tendency to
decrease substantially since the late Sixties and early Seventies. In this paper we suggest
an extension to standard explanations of mobility, namely the insider advantage theory
of immobility. We argue that for most people in Europe it is fully rational not to
consider moving because they have accumulated too many location-specific insider
advantages over time. Even if substantial macro-economic differences persist on the
aggregate level, moving away will generally not be beneficial from an individual point
of view, due to the costs of accumulated location-specific insider advantages that would
be sunk in case of out-migration. The longer people stay, the more they have
accumulated such insider advantages and the less likely they will be to move. Therefore,
(im)mobility should be highly duration dependent.
In this paper we use a newly released, very comprehensive micro dataset on people
resident in Swedish labour markets in 1994 to test our insider advantages approach. Due
to the availability of extensive information about each individual it has been possible to
test the partial effect of various factors on the probabilities of staying within the same
regional labour market. In line with our insider advantages theory we find substantial
empirical support for immobility being strongly duration dependent. Furthermore,
duration at a certain location matters more than duration at a workplace. Both socio-
economic characteristics and family ties turn out to be important determinants of
immobility, while aggregate regional attributes like wage differences or vacancy rates
perform badly.
In section 2, we first introduce the insider-advantage approach towards explaining
immobility. Section three introduces the data and the model. Section four discusses the
results of its estimation on Swedish data. Part five concludes.
2.  Explaining (im)mobility
Classical migration theories explain mobility in terms of differences between attributes
of places on the macro level, group dynamics and networking on the meso level and9
socio-economic characteristics and behavioural strategies on the micro-level.1 Studies
using aggregate data have shown that changes in place-specific living standards and
labour market conditions may explain fluctuations in migration flows (Ghatak, Levine
and Wheatley Price 1996). However, despite considerable macro-economic differences
persisting both between many countries as well as within,2 and despite technological
and political reductions in the obstacles to migration, the vast majority of people have
not and do not consider moving.3 To complicate things even further, migration flows do
not necessarily diminish between places that seem very similar on an aggregate level.
Although contributing insights as to why some people move, classical explanations are
somewhat unsatisfactory in explaining why most people never consider moving. While
Stark (1991) and Stark, Helmenstein and Yegorov (1997) concentrate on the optimal
duration of migration and on return migration we suggest a new approach to explain
immobility which we call the insider-advantage theory. The insider advantage theory in
itself accommodates several elements of traditional explanations but derives some new
conclusions with respect to the underlying dynamics of mover-stayer decisions.
Under the conventional micro-level migration analysis a decision maker compares her
or his present and future level of utility in different macro-level units on the basis of her
or his present stock of assets and abilities. In most cases this is not a realistic judgement
because a certain part of the abilities and assets of every human being are location-
specific, in other words they can only be used (or are only in existence) in a specific
                                                
1  For a new and comprehensive comparative multidisciplinary survey on theories of migration see
Hammar et al. 1997, and for a shorter review that more explicitly treats issues of economic
methodology Bauer and Zimmermann 1997 and Greenwood 1997.
2  Research on international migration has often been conducted separately of research on internal
migration (Korcelli 1994). In our empirical work, we analyse regional  in- and out-migration in
Sweden. But from an economic or geographic point of view, the distinction between internal and
international migration is rather arbitrary. For both ￿types￿ of migration individuals will have to make
the same considerations, the only difference being that with increasing geographical and cultural
distance the cost of moving and maintaining previous networks increases while the transferability of
insider advantages decreases. Accumulating new location-specific knowledge and abilities may
become more difficult. That national borders coincide with the significant demarcation line between
low and high economic, social and cultural costs of moving become more unlikely the more countries
integrate economically.  Although the quantification of respective effects needs further research, we
are thus convinced, that the importance of insider-advantages effects in explaining immobility holds
for international migration too.
3  With respect to the decrease in obstacles to migration we think not only of the general reduction in
transport and communication costs and the progress in international economic integration. We also
refer to political developments like the fall of the ￿iron curtain￿. Hunt (2000) examines why people
still live in East Germany. However, she stays within a rather traditional analysis and concludes that
convergence in hourly wages is the most important factor to explain the downward trend in German
east to west migration.10
place. These are what we call insider-advantages. They are not transferable to other
places of work and residence. An important part of these abilities has to be obtained
within a location specific learning process which requires time, information and
temporary immobility. Mobility turns such investments into lost sunk costs, i.e. costs
which are tied to a specific project or - in this case - a specific location and which are
lost in the case of out-migration.  Strong ties to places, people and projects are
constraints to migration (Malmberg 1997). Therefore, immobility is a utility
maximizing strategy to a majority of people because the loss of location specific assets
and abilities induced by migration would be too severe and because it is immobility
which allows individuals to accumulate insider-advantages.
With respect to mobility, Becker (1962) and his scholars emphasised that part of the
knowledge an individual acquires is often firm-specific and can not be transferred to
another employment. Migration may therefore result in a decrease of potentially
achievable relative wages because firm-specific abilities are ’sunk’ in case of a change of
workplace. In its exclusive concentration on firm-specific insider advantages, however,
Becker￿s approach seems to us too rigid to satisfactorily explain immobility.4
Figure 1 gives a graphical representation of the structure of our insider-advantage idea.
It differentiates insider-advantages according to their origin (work- or leisure-related)
and specificity (firm-, place- or society-specific).
Place-specific advantages make the individual particularly attractive for all or at least
some firms in his region of work. Examples of such insider advantages are expertise in
the location-specific preferences, desires and habits of clients or insider knowledge of
the peculiarities of the political situation in a region. Society-specific advantages broadly
emanate from the social relations and political activities an immobile individual builds
up within the society in which he/she is residing (lobbying, political networks). Firm,
place- and society-specific work-oriented insider advantages lead to higher revenues for
the individual, in the form of wages or other income.
                                                
4 For a somewhat different treatment of location-specific advantages emanating from the labour supply
side see Chiswick (1986). The insider-outsider concept is of course not a new innovation. It has been
used in different fields of economics and became especially popular in labour market economics (see
e.g. Lindbeck and Snower 1986, 1994).11
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All non-work oriented, consumption focused location-specific knowledge we label
leisure-oriented location-specific insider advantages. They allow a resident to reach a
higher utility level with a given set of monetary or other resources and time. Examples
of place-specific leisure-oriented insider advantages can range from information about
the ￿good-value-for-money￿ Italian restaurant round the corner to knowledge about
cultural events and the local housing market. Society-specific leisure-oriented insider
advantages capture the utility increase a decision-maker and his family get from having
friends, being socially integrated, accepted and active at a certain place of residence.
These insider advantages result from a locational investment in ￿social capital’ (Faist
1997) which encompasses a wide range of human contacts, from family relations and
friendships to membership of clubs and political parties. Mobility generally induces the
loss of most of these abilities and assets and requires new investments in obtaining a
￿ticket to entry￿ at a new place of residence. Place of origin related networks of
￿compatriots￿ at the place of destination may lower this loss.12
The more developed economies are, and the relatively more important leisure time
becomes in comparison to working time, the more leisure-oriented insider advantages
ought to matter for the decision to stay or to go. Admittedly leisure-oriented insider
advantages are for the most part difficult to quantify in monetary terms. Nevertheless is
should be possible to control their importance indirectly. If duration of stay increases
the probability of staying irrespective of duration of employment or if, for example,
having children decreases individual propensities to move, then this is likely to be due
to leisure-oriented insider advantages rather than work-oriented ones.
Intertemporally, insider-advantages may be partly recovered and ￿updated￿ if one
returns, but they nevertheless strongly increase the (opportunity) costs of staying away.
There may be some cases where the benefits of being an outsider  create the very
incentive to move (for example a Chinese offering traditional Chinese medical practices
to a European clientel in Paris). But such situations tend to be exceptional.  While
outsider advantages may be an incentive to move for a few, our argument is that insider
advantages provide reason enough to stay for most.
There is some similarity between our insider-advantage approach and the human capital
approach. The human capital approach emphasises the point that people are very
different in their characteristics and their abilities and that migration may be a form of
investment on which the return will occur within a given future time span. The insider-
advantage approach stresses that during periods of immobility at a particular location
individuals invest in the accumulation of location specific skills, abilities and assets. By
this they can increase the realisable individual utility at this location significantly.
Therefore there may be very little migration even if on an aggregate level considerable
locational differences in average incomes, unemployment risks or endowment with
natural amenities exist. There is little migration because individuals rightly expect that a
move might decrease her personal utility due to the incurred loss on non-transferable
knowledge and the costly need to acquire new insider-advantages in order to get into a
similar relative position at the new location.5
Hägerstrand (1975, 1993) has pointed to the influence of constraints on migration.  He
identified people￿s engagement in everyday projects and activities, such as work,
studies, hobbies, friends and family, as decisive for long term decisions and related the
                                                
5  In that sense, the insider-advantage approach to explain immobility can also be seen as an alternative,
more explicit formulation of traditional migration costs.13
propensity to move to the possibility to transfer or substitute these local ￿projects￿.
Major life events have been identified as major determinants of family migration.
Getting a job, starting an education, get married, having babies and buying a house are
events that strengthen the ties to a specific place, while events such as loosing job,
ending education, get divorced and children leaving home increase the propensity to
migrate positively.
Important empirical implications of the insider-advantage approach to immobility are
that mobility patterns should be duration dependent and that the degree of
transferability of skills, abilities and personal relations ought to be of central importance
for observed (im-)mobility behaviour. The more people have accumulated location-
specific insider-advantages and the less transferable their abilities and current ￿life-
projects￿ are, the more likely it is that they stay immobile. Somebody who has moved
recently and thus already has lost his accumulated insider-advantages should be more
likely to move again. The longer she or he stays at the new place of residence, the
smaller the probability of an additional move.6
3.  The Model and Data
3.1 The Model
We start with a standard neo-classical utility maximising migration function and assume
that individuals decide whether to move or not by comparing expected utilities at
alternative destinations with their present situation. The net present value NPV is made
up by the difference over time between expected discounted utilities at an alternative
destination and at the present one. Different kinds of utilities are realised with different
probabilities. For our empirical analysis, however, it is impossible to observe actual
utilities. What we can observe is the result of the decision making process only: people
                                                
6 To exclude some of the standard hypotheses of labour market analysis concerning the effects of
duration of stay and to identify the duration dependent and labour market related insider advantage we
could also examine whether the annual wage increase of newcomers differs from the one of people
that have been there for a longer period already. However, in this paper we leave open whether this
analysis might change our empirical results because the data necessary to test the hypothesis properly
are not available. Finally, immobility could also be the consequence of a duration dependent higher
appreciation of locally segregated cultural or social milieus. It could be that private consumption in a
group or network specific context generates positive social consumption externalities. Bades on a
model by Pollak (1979), Binder and Pearan (1997) have shown that an inclusion of consumption
interdependencies does not change the empirical validity of a standard consumption analysis.14
either stay or go. If individuals decide to move when the expected net present utility of
staying at another location exceeds the one at the present place of residence, we have
the relation between utilities and probability stated in the random utility model. Here,
the decision to stay or go includes, apart from the utility comparison, a place-specific
random term ε :
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(1)
where uk=f(Xk), k  are different categories of utility, i assigns to the present place of
residence and j an alternative location.  Θ represents the discount factor  and  cij  covers
the (direct) migration costs of moving from i to j.
To simplify notation, let us label the discounted and probability-weighted utilities with
U. In line with our insider advantages model we distinguish between two broad
categories of utilities, work-oriented utilities UWO and leisure-oriented utilities ULO.
Thus (individual) location-specific utilities are conceived as:
i i i i i ULO UWO u ε µ + + + =  (2)
They result from a fixed but place-specific component µ i (natural amenities etc.), the
sum of work and leisure oriented utilities plus a random but place-specific component ε
i.
With respect to the determination of UWO  and  ULO individual time horizons and
discount factors are obviously dependent on age. The standard migration theory implies
that  UWO  and  ULO  are furthermore conditional on individual microeconomic
characteristics XMIC like education and experience (Becker 1962).  An individual￿s
family situation (marital status, number of children etc.) may matter for the
determination of the disposable household income as well as its use (Stark and Bloom
1985, Stark 1991). Also we expect region-specific macro factors XMAC like labour
market conditions (unemployment and vacancies rates) or general regional attributes
(wage level, local opportunities) to be important for the determination of place-specific
utilities. Provided that the life-course event theory of mobility proves relevant, we
should find utilities to be further dependent on life course events LCE like the formation
or disintegration of households, engaging in educational activities, getting unemployed
or having a baby. Last but not least, the insider-advantages theory suggests that the15
amount of location-specific insider advantages IA an individual has accumulated over
time will be important in defining the work and leisure oriented utilities a person can
expect to achieve at a certain place. Given our insider advantage hypothesis, we expect
IA to be a function of duration of stay and transferability of skills7 and abilities. Thus:
) (
) (
i i i i i
i i i i i
XIA XLCE XMAC XMIC h ULO
XIA XLCE XMAC XMIC g UWO
+ + + =
+ + + =
                                                           (3)
and consequently, the probability of staying will be determined as:
( ) ij j j j j i i i i c ULO UWO ULO UWO prob stay prob − + + + > + + + = = ε µ ε µ ) 1 (         (4)
Given the discussed determinants of the decision to stay or go, we estimate the
individual probability of staying in terms of a probit model as:
) ] [ ] , [
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Here, the constant µ ij captures both, differences in location-specific amenities as well as
immediate moving costs cij. To test for the relative importance of the accumulation of
work and leisure-oriented insider advantages, we will include both time since last
change of employer and time since last change of residence. With respect to other
determinants, it is obviously difficult to know whether regressors proxy work or leisure
oriented insider effects. Distinguishing between the two remains therefore to some
extent a question of interpretation.
3.2 The Data
The empirical investigation in this paper relies on data from the TOPSWING database.
This new database links information from various official statistical registers and
censuses as provided by Statistics Sweden. It covers anonymised micro data for the total
population resident in Sweden between 1985 and 1995, i.e. more than 9 million people.
It includes information about an individual￿s place of residence and work, age, gender,
                                                
7  For a recent discussion of the role of skill transferability in immigrant performance see Friedberg
(2000).16
education, income, employment, profession as well as household conditions and links to
family members (see appendix 1 for further information on the variables used).
In this paper we are interested in inter-regional migration that is not purely residential
but involves both, a change of residence and a change of workplace. Our data does not
constrain us to use politically defined county borders. Instead, in what follows we will
use economically defined labour market regions as spatial resolution of our analyses.
Labour market regions are defined by Statistics Sweden and the Swedish Department of
Finance as to minimise inter-regional commuting (Finansdepartementet 1994). Using
these labour market regions we separate the territory of Sweden into 108 different
regional labour markets. For this study we have drawn a sample of all movers over
labour market regions during the years of the study (1994 and 1989) and a control group
of  2% of Swedish-born stayers and 20% of non-moving immigrants. In our
calculations individual observations have been weighted as to represent the true
proportion in total population.
As in many other European countries, mobility in Sweden has not only been low but has
also exhibited a tendency to decrease until the last few years when a (small) increase in
mobility of especially young and well educated people has been observed. Figure 2
shows how emigration propensities decreased relatively steadily in the 1970s and 1980s
and have resurged during the last three years.
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Source: Statistics  Sweden.17
During 1994 about 15 per cent of the population in Sweden changed address, but only
2,3 per cent of the population had moved over the border of a labour market region. If
the data period is extended to ten years (1985-1995) 87% of the population still lived in
the same labour market region.
Bengtson and Johanson (1993) point out some possible explanations to the trend of
decreasing mobility in Sweden. They emphasise the low regional income variations, the
increase in public job opportunities and the growing number of  two income families;
trends that are also found in other developed economies. Indeed, (im)mobility patterns
have been similar to those observed in other European countries. Studies of immobility
in the Swedish context thus might reveal some Sweden-specific characteristics, but
generally speaking the determinants affecting the patterns of immobility should be very
similar to the situation in other European countries.
4.  Determinants of Immobility: Estimation Results
4.1 Duration and socio-economic Characteristics Matter
Table 1 shows the results of our probit estimations of the propensity to stay in a
Swedish labour market for all people aged between 19 and 64 who have stayed for at
least 12 months prior to moving and for whom the necessary information is available.
The sample comprises 286,356 observations, which allow for a relatively detailed
combination of explanatory variables. Results are provided for five different models
derived from equation (4). These five are all nested.8 They are built in order to allow
checking for the relative importance of our arguments and the stability of the different
parameters. Model (1) includes duration variables linked to our insider-advantages
hypothesis only. Model (2) adds the ￿classic￿ socio-economic micro and region-specific
macro factors. Model (3) also includes ￿life-course events￿, model (4) checks for the
importance of different places of birth and model (5) introduces occupational dummies.
An asterix (￿*￿) at the end of the Log-L term indicates that a Log-likelihood ratio test
rejects  the hypotheses that the model is not  significantly better than the less
comprehensive nested one with a probability larger than 0.99. It thus indicates that
                                                
8 Actually, model (1) is nested in (2), (2) in (3), (3) in (4) and (5) but (4) not in (5).18
despite the absence of improvements in the pseudo-R
2 the more comprehensive model
includes additional explanatory factors that are jointly significant.9
Our estimation results provide support for the insider advantage hypothesis that people
are immobile because they accumulate location-specific insider advantages which are
sunk in case of a move. The longer people stay at a certain place, the less likely they are
to move. In model (1) we regress the probability of staying on just duration of stay in
months, years since last change of employer, number of previous moves and for
immigrants years since immigration. Immigrants should be more mobile (because they
already lost their insider advantages), but their behaviour should approximate natives’
overtime. To control for the possibility that the expected duration effects occur only
because one gets older and is therefore less likely to move, we also control for age and
allow the effect of age being non-linear by including an age square term in the
regression. If immobility were determined mainly by the accumulation of firm and
work-specific insider advantages, we would expect ￿years since last change of
employer￿ to be a chief determinant of the probability to stay. If leisure-oriented place-
and society-specific insider advantages matter more, this should show up in a
corresponding importance of the general duration of stay variable. For duration of stay
we have checked various specifications, but the simplest linear one applied here proved
best.10
For model 1, age shows the usual significant properties. Immobility is a very age-
specific phenomenon. More than two thirds of all movers in Sweden have been between
                                                
9  Note that unlike in OLS-regressions it is impossible in binary choice models to calculate an R2 that
sets true and estimated y into proportion and explains the part of the total variance an estimated model
explains.  For discrete choice estimation, several goodness of fit indicators have been proposed (for a
discussion of the most prominent alternatives see Amemiya 1981 and Veall and Zimmermann 1992).
Most of them aim to approximately mimic the properties of the OLS-R2 and are therefore also called
pseudo-R2.a We calculated and provide two pseudo-R2 that have been found to mimic best the
properties of the traditional regression R2 (Windmeijer, 1995). R2-MZL is the indicator proposed by
McKelvey and Zavoina (1975) and Laitila (1995). R2-MF provides the popular likelihood ratio index
developed my McFadden (1974).
10 Initially it may take some time before a mover reconsiders a move he has just made. Thus we could
expect the likeliness to move to be very low initially, then increase considerably and thereafter
decrease again. Such a pattern could e.g. be captured by a logistic specification of the duration effect.
In an investigation on UK data Gordon and Molho (1995) find an ￿inverted-U curve effect￿ of duration
for local, residential mobility. In our data on mobility between labour market regions in Sweden, we
do not find such a non-linear effect. If the probability of moving further on (or back) is low initially
and increases only after some time, then this happens within less than one year of stay which is the
minimum duration requirement for moves to be included in our investigation. We also did not find
any significantly decreasing (or increasing) effect of duration that a polynomial specification of the
duration term would capture.19
20 and 35 years old. But controlling for this, both duration variables turn out significant
and show the expected sign. The probability of staying is thus highly duration
dependent. Duration of stay is estimated to be both, much more significant and more
important in magnitude, than duration since last change of employer. Two to three
additional months of stay in the same labour market make up for one year with the same
employer. Although model (1) obviously suffers from omission bias, its goodness of fit
is quite remarkable. The ￿years since immigration￿ variable produces the expected effect
clearly. Having just recently immigrated, foreign born people are significantly more
mobile than native born.  The  number of previous moves still increases the likelihood
of moving significantly, but less than half a year of staying at the same place and
employer increases the probability of staying by more than a previous move decreases
it.11
Comparing parameter estimates in model (1) to (5) reveals that model 1 suffers from
omission bias and therefore overestimates the importance of the duration and age
effects. But once we account for individual socio-economic characteristics and regional
differences in model (2), the duration parameters continue to be among the most
important explanatory factors of mobility behaviour. Even if we add further significant
additional explanatory factors in subsequent models the duration effects remain very
robust. 12
                                                
11 The more the number of previous moves contributes to the explanatory power of a model, the better
one could argue that the migratory behaviour of individuals is due to unobservable factors that divide
the population permanently into two heterogeneous groups of movers and stayers. Given the relatively
modest importance and significance of previous moves, our results indicate that the above argument
does not hold as such: there is more we know about (im)mobility than just explaining migration by
previous migration.
12 With our cross-sectional data we can not completely rule out, that the estimated strong duration effect
results to some extend also from sorting. A definite answer on the relative importance of the
endogenous emergence of reasons to stay versus sorting effects has to be left for further research. But
several tests have led us to the conclusion that accumulated insider advantages indeed play an
important role here while the sorting effect is probably a relatively minor phenomenon. First, given
the relatively modest importance and significance of previous moves relative to the duration of stay
effect, our results indicate that unobservable factors that divide the population permanently into two
heterogeneous groups of movers and stayers are of minor importance here. There is more we know
about (im)mobility than just explaining migration by previous migration. Second, assuming that a
break-up of the household e.g. due to divorce or also becoming adult represent ￿exogenous shocks￿
that would expose all individuals concerned to a new sorting process, we estimated our models
separately for people divorcing and for persons aged 18 to 20. The results (available from the authors
on request) show that the duration of staying effect remains relatively stable and highly significant,
while other determinants except those related to education, the family and the individual employment




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3: Propensity to Stay in 1994 by Duration of Stay 1985-93
















































































Source: Own calculations based on data from Statistics Sweden as provided in the TOPSWING
database, Department of Social and Economic Geography, Ume￿ University.
Figure 3 illustrates the unconditional effect of duration of stay on the probability of
staying in our data. It shows that while about one fifth of those individuals who have
migrated a year ago moved again in 1994, less than half a per cent of those who stayed
for ten years moved again in 1994. To illustrate the simultaneous working of the
different partial effects in our probit model, we have simulated the probability of staying
by duration of stay for some typical individuals depicted in figure 4.13 It demonstrates
how duration of stay makes a more important difference for individuals who are ￿at risk￿
of moving.14
                                                
13 All the simulations depicted in figure 3 and 5 use the coefficients estimated in model 3.
14 The small magnitude of the duration effect at mean characteristics is first of all because the average
individual is immobile prone, but it also results from several different explanatory variables
simultaneously moving away from mean characteristics if somebody is less immobile. In probit
estimations the predicted mean probability of staying corresponds to the mean distribution of the
bivariate variable in the sample. In our case, where about 98 per cent of people are stayers, the
predicted probability of staying for individuals with mean characteristics and an average duration of
stay is thus about 0.98. In other words, at average characteristics and the mean age of 40, all people
are highly unlikely to move. The difference in the probability of staying implied by our probit
estimation results between the representative average individual who has moved a year ago and the
one who has remained in the same region for the last ten years is close to three per cent.23
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exam ple C, 40, low skilled,
m arried, both working, 2 kids,
own house, last empl. change 10
years ago
example B, 40, married, both
working, 1 child, last change of
empl. 10 years ago
all mean (age 40.5) and zero
previous moves
exam ple C, 24, low skilled,
m arried, both working, last
change of employer 2 years ago
example B, 24, married, both
working, last change of
employer 2 years ago
example A, 40, single,
employed, last change of
employer 10 years ago
example A, 24, single,
employed, last change of
employer 2 years ago
example A, 24, (got)
unemployed after finishing
studies, in education again
Source: own simulations using estimation results of model 3.
Assume an individual who has just completed first degree university studies, became
unemployed and then decided to continue with some further education. Our person is
now 24 years old and lives as a single in a rented apartment. For this typical individual
￿A￿ the probability of staying ranges between 0.71 and 0.88. Whether the person has
stayed for one or for ten years at the same place of residence makes a difference of 17
per cent in the probability of staying, while for the 40 year old, less skilled married
person ￿C’ who has two kids, owns an own house and has not changed employer during
the last ten years the difference amounts to just half a per cent. For ￿A￿ relative to ￿B￿
and ￿C￿, higher education as well as being not married and not having a working partner
decrease the probability to stay.
The different examples ￿A￿, ￿B￿ and ￿C￿ demonstrate the strong joint effect of age,
marital status and duration since employment on the probability to stay. Being 24 or 40
makes a large difference in probability of staying for the highly educated working single
named ￿A￿, while it is of considerably less importance to the married, low skilled
individual ￿C’.24
All in all, duration of stay proves to be an important determinant of the probability of
staying which becomes enforced by changes in age, family formation etc. that typically
occur while people stay immobile. Altogether they explain the strong overall relation
between duration of stay and probability of staying shown in graph 3.
Although adding in model (2) individual socio-economic characteristics and regional
differences in macro variables increases the goodness of fit only moderately, the
increase in the validity of the model as measured in terms of the Log-Likelihood is
highly significant.15 Socio-economic variables show the expected signs and prove
significant. Apart from age,  education  turns out to be an important determinant of
immobility. Presumably the skills of less educated people are less transferable
locationally than those of the highly skilled and the return on moving is lower. In
previous work using census information on the socio-economic position of individuals
we found less skilled blue collar worker as well as farmers to be particularly immobile
while white collar highly skilled are particularly mobile (Fischer and Malmberg 1998).
Foreign born individuals are in general significantly less immobile than the native born,
but with years since immigration increasing the difference fades away. As the mobility
enhancing effect of education is significantly less pronounced for foreign born than for
natives, the (im)mobility patterns of high skilled foreign born approach these of the
native born faster than those of the unskilled.16
Houseownership obviously contributes significantly to explaining immobility. Owning
a house probably entails individual and place-specific rents that are sunk in case of a
move and which are relevant enough to keep people from moving.17
                                                
15 The fact that the pseudo-R2 increases only marginally despite highly significant variables being added
is indeed somewhat puzzling. This could e.g. be due to multicollinearity, but correlations between the
different variables are all below 0.8.
16 In our simulations the propensity to stay of a highly skilled foreign born ￿A￿ equals the one of a native
born after roughly 11 years while for the unskilled ￿C￿ it may take more than 20 years to line up with
their native born ￿twin￿. At the mean duration of 14 years since immigration (for which estimation
results are most reliable) ￿average￿ foreign born individuals are thus still somewhat more mobile than
the native born population, even if we account for differences in the other explanatory variables.
However, compared to general socio-economic criteria, being foreign born proves to be of relatively
marginal importance for the probability of staying.
17 It could be argued that  houseownership is endogenous to the decision to stay immobile. We tend to
believe that owning a house is often a prior target that individuals try to achieve without thinking
about potential consequences for their (im)mobility. Often they realise what problems and costs a
change of house would entail only after having seriously considered a certain move.25
Furthermore it proves very fruitful to include the individuals￿ family situation. Not only
whether one is married or not but even more so whether one has a working partner
affects the probability of staying strongly. The more a partner earns, the larger the
potential costs or insider advantages that are sunk in case of a move.18 Having children
significantly increases the probability of staying too. In line with the premises of
economic labour market theory people are found to be more mobile if they or a family
member becomes unemployed. Our findings thus confirm the literature that stresses the
importance of the family in migration decisions (Bloom and Stark 1985). The disutility
from moving is the sum of all the lost insider advantages of the whole family, including
those of school-age children moving schools.
4.2 Poor Performance of Regional Macro Variables
Contrary to what one would expect from traditional migration theory, regional
differences in macroeconomic variables performed very poorly  in explaining
immobility. We constructed and tested various indicators of regional differences in
employment and unemployment intensities, average income and wage levels as well as
vacancies rates. They proved usually insignificant and regularly even showed the wrong
sign. Because regional employment patterns and wage levels are highly correlated, we
had to choose a few particular indicators. As a crude proxy for the possibility that
individuals value opportunities in the proximity different than more remote ones, we
constructed regional indicators relative to the average in the neighbouring region on the
one hand and relative to all other, more remote regions on the other hand. Our
estimations suggest that (im)mobility patterns do not seem to be dependent on regional
employment intensity differences. People tend to be more immobile in regions where
worker￿s mean income level is relatively higher. The variable we used measures mean
income in thousands of Swedish Kroner for those who earned at least SKr 50,000 a year
(as a proxy for regional development). But the effect is very small. The effect of the
difference between the average income level in the labour market in which one was
resident at the beginning of 1994 and the average in the surrounding labour markets
turns out to be insignificant. This is the more surprising as differences between the
                                                
18 In examining the data a logistic specification of income proved more appropriate than a linear one.
Note that this implies that it matters a lot whether or not a partner earns some income from
employment. But the marginal effect of additional income on the probability of staying decreases
exponentially.26
levels of average regional income from work were not that minor: the lowest was more
than 40,000 Swedish Kroner or 40 per cent less than the highest average income. The
difference between average work incomes in the ￿home￿ and neighbouring regions
ranged between SKr ￿16,000 and SKr +27,000. Also relative vacancy rates turned out
to have been insignificant in determining individual probabilities to stay.
Generally, mobility patterns do not show distinct regional patterns in Sweden.19 One
regional difference turns out to be clearly significant and noteworthy, however: People
living in the three large metropolitan regions of Sweden (Stockholm, Gothenburg and
Malm￿) are significantly and considerably more immobile than individuals living in the
rest of the country. We have tested whether people living in larger, more urban labour
markets are generally less mobile because they have more alternative opportunities
nearby (we included the size of a region￿s population in the estimations). We also
checked whether the metropolitan effect could be primarily related to regions
incorporating university towns. Both hypotheses we had to reject. We are thus inclined
to conclude that metropolitan regions offer more scope for the accumulation of location-
specific insider advantages and thereby keep people staying.
Furthermore, our results indicate that people are more inclined to leave labour markets
that are characterised by a large share of industry, while they are especially likely to
stay in labour markets that are characterised by the relatively high importance of the
educational sector.
4.3 Life-course Specificity and the Labour Market
The life-course hypothesis stipulates that probabilities of staying or moving are strongly
life-course situation-specific. These life events may be labour market related but are
also often not. The dissolution of a household e.g. will deprive the splitting individual
from a good deal of his society-specific leisure oriented insider advantages. We would
thus expect her probability to move significantly. On the other hand, engaging in
education constraints the ability to move for a certain period of time, while completing
an education will correspondingly decrease the probability to stay. We have added some
                                                
19 Including region-specific fixed dummies results in the estimation of significant coefficients for only
10 out of 108 labour markets. Included in these 10 are the three metropolitan areas covered by the
metropolitan dummy.27
life-course events for which we had information in our data in model (3). This again
significantly improves its validity in terms of log-likelihood very significantly. From
model (3) it becomes clear that being in education is one of the most important causes
for mobility.20 It increases the probability of moving by more than being unemployed.
That individuals engaging in education are often also out of the labour force enforces
the effect even further and probably explains much of the high relevance of the out of
the labour force variable.
Notwithstanding the fact that most people are young when they move, building a new or
splitting from a previous household are also highly significant factors that induce people
to move over labour market borders. Having a baby may also increase mobility, but for
that the estimated coefficient is insignificant. Note also that while having a new baby
represents a new life-course situation that initially may decreases the probability of
staying, having an additional child (who also accumulates place-specific insider
advantages) significantly increases immobility.
With respect to labour market issues we have also tested for the importance of becoming
(and not just being) unemployed in 1994, for both, oneself and the partner, irrespective
of the length of actual unemployment and the sum of benefits received. Both ￿life
events￿ increase mobility and the coefficient of becoming unemployed oneself was
highly significant.21
                                                
20 Indeed, 23.6 per cent of all movers have been recorded as ￿in education￿. The corresponding share in
the total population has been only 8.1 per cent.
21 The probability that the ￿partner gets unemployed￿ coefficient is significant at the 10 per cent
significance level too.28
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Source: own simulations using estimation results of model 3.
Labour market issues provide an evident opportunity to illustrate the interaction
between labour market issues, family situation and life course events. Figure 5 results
from simulations of the probability of staying by duration of stay for a typical individual
conditional on her employment and family situation. It shows that the 25 year old single
who became unemployed during 1994 is most likely to move, although this will still be
highly dependent on her duration of stay. Having just moved a year ago or living at the
same place for ten years makes a difference of 12 per cent to her probability of staying.
If the same individual is married to a partner who earns a substantial income from
employment, then this decreases her probability of moving by a remarkable 4 to 8 per
cent. Indeed, the 25-year-old unemployed who lives with a working partner who earns
SKr 80,000 a year turns out practically as likely to stay as the employed single.29
Being employed and married to a partner who also earns an income of SKr. 80,000
increases the likelihood to stay for the employed by another two to six per cent,
depending on the duration of stay. Having a child makes then the minor difference of
less than a per cent additional increase in the probability of staying.
In brief the mobility effect of unemployment is not only dependent on individual socio-
economic characteristics, but also on whether one became unemployed recently, is
single or married, has children or not and last but not least whether the partner earns a
substantial own income. Becoming unemployed is likely to be a relevant incentive to
inter-regional labour market mobility in certain life course situations, namely when one
is young and single or young and married to a non-working partner.
4.4 Place of Birth and Occupation make little Difference
Are individual propensities to move significantly different depending on the country
somebody comes from? Model (4) checks for this possibility by adding region of origin-
specific dummies. Though it seems that immigrants from more developed countries are
more mobile than others and the respective coefficients are significant, country-specific
effects do not contribute notably to the explanation of the probability of staying.
Immigrants are more mobile after immigration and adapt to native patterns over the
years,22 but this difference does not significantly depend on their region of origin.
Model (4) which distinguishes between different groups of country of birth does not fit
the data significantly better than model (3) which includes a general dummy for foreign
born only.
In model (5) we test for the hypotheses that mobility patterns are occupational-specific,
e.g. due to insider advantages being more important for some occupations than others.
Model (5) adds to model (3) 14 occupational dummies which all are in reference to
occupations in industry. Farmers and  construction workers seem to be significantly
more immobile than people occupied in industry, while people working in the hotel and
restaurant business, banking and insurance, general public administration as well as in
different unspecified services show significantly higher mobility rates. All other groups
                                                
22 This finding corresponds well to the implications of  the assimilation literature (Chiswick1986, 1992),
but of course the general caveat for cross-sectional investigations applies here too, that one cannot
really distinguish cohort from real assimilation effects (Borjas 1985)30
exhibit no significant differences. Contrary to our expectations individuals engaged in
research as well as those engaged in teaching are not found significantly more mobile
than industrial workers and those working with real estate were not less mobile. The
significantly lower mobility in construction is likely to be a kind of statistical artefact.
Construction workers in Sweden are known to be particularly mobile but do not usually
change their registered residence when they move to work at a different place for a
limited period of time.
Adding occupational dummies to our model does not improve the indicators of
goodness of fit. Contrary to the country dummies it does significantly increase the log-
likelihood, but this increase is still relatively small. Instead of occupation we have also
in vain tested for differences according to profession. An indicator measuring the
geographical dispersion of jobs over labour markets by occupation did not prove
significant neither. All in all we conclude that (im)mobility pattern in Sweden have
generally not been occupational-specific.
4.5 Group-specific Heterogeneity
On the one hand, the above results have the advantage of being rather general and of
making optimal use of the variation in the data. On the other hand, they are
unfortunately prone to group-specific heterogeneity that the general model does not
manage to capture sufficiently.23 Out of different group-specific estimations,
distinguishing between ￿young￿ and ￿old￿ and between ￿employed￿ and ￿not employed￿
seems to cover the most important sources of heterogeneity.24 Separate estimation
results of model 3 for all people aged 19 to 29 (the age in which the majority of moves
actually occur) as compared to people aged 30 to 64 and for those employed versus
                                                
23 What we discuss here concerns heterogeneity with respect to the determinants of mobility (i.e. the
coefficients). Another problem which often appears in large cross-sectional data is heterogeneity with
respect to the random variance term (Davidson and McKinnon 1993). This may first of all affect the
standard errors of the estimated coefficients in the sense that they become too large, a problem that is
unlikely to affect our results. But in binary choice models it may also bias the coefficients itself
(Yatchew and Griliches 1984). Some testing for heterogeneity produced inconclusive results. Probit
models with heterogeneity are often weakly identified. Multicollinearity is a common problem
(Greene 1993:423). Unfortunately, standard software procedures ￿ including those implemented in
limdep that we used- do not allow to estimate heterogeneity corrected probit models with the kind of
choice based samples we had to work with.
24 Separate estimations by gender result in minor differences in the estimated coefficients only. Results
are available from the authors on request.31
those not employed (i.e. either unemployed or out of the labour force) are provided in
appendix 2. They show that while the mobility of the young group is estimated to
increase strongly and significantly during the first years, age does not matter anymore
in the estimation of the probability of staying for the older ones.25
The mobility enhancing effect of education  turns out considerably stronger for the
young group than the older ones, but only for the native born. Not too surprisingly, the
(very strong) importance of the in education dummy applies to the younger age group
only, but somewhat surprisingly the mobility enhancing effect of being out of the labour
force is significantly stronger for the older age group, possibly due to early retirement
relocations. The life-course events that concern the partner (splitting from an existing
household or having a partner who becomes unemployed) are important in the older age
group  only. But for both groups, being married and having children increases
immobility similarly.
Qualitatively, the separate estimation results for those employed and not employed are
rather similar. For both groups, the effect of duration of staying in a labour market is
important, highly significant and similar in magnitude. Unexpectedly, years since last
change of employer turns out significant for the not employed only. From our point of
view it may further underline the importance of place- and society-specific insider
advantages relative to firm-specific ones. As one would expect, the income of the
partner, the ￿migration history￿ in terms of numbers of previous moves as well as family
and life-course event specific variables are somewhat more important for those not
employed than for those employed. The strong mobility enhancing effect of being in
education concerns mainly those not employed. It illustrates that an important part of
those who are out of the labour force consists of (presumably predominantly young)
students and people in vocational training.
To see whether our 1994 results (a time when Sweden was hit by a severe economic
downturn) were sensitive to business cycle effects we ran comparative estimations for
the probability of staying in 1989 (an absolute boom year in the Swedish economy). The
results provided surprisingly little evidence for strong business-cycle specific effects on
                                                
25 However, the shift in sign and strong change in magnitude between the two models indicates that
neither of the submodels manages to capture correctly a probably gradually changing effect of age on
the probability of staying.32
immobility.26 Patterns are very similar for both estimations. Contrary to the estimations
for 1994, however, the variable capturing differences in average work income in the
own versus neighbouring regions was for the 1989 sample significant at the one per cent
level and showed the right sign. Also, the mobility enhancing effect of being
unemployed was significantly stronger in 1989 than in 1994. But the labour income of a
working partner was a more important reason to stay immobile in 1994 than in 1989.
Probably, due to more opportunities being available, relative regional work income
differences play a somewhat more important role in better economic times while having
a partner who still has a job is more of a reason to stay in periods of economic
downturn.27
5. Conclusions and Interpretation
Our empirical investigation of mobility between Swedish labour markets identifies
immobility as a strong and persistent behavioural strategy for the large majority of
people. The estimation results support our argument that insider advantages and
duration effects of staying are crucial in gaining a better understanding of the
immobility phenomenon. We suggest that people stay because in time they have
accumulated so many location-specific insider advantages that would be sunk in the
case of migration that moving would decrease their individual utility even if wage levels
differ substantially between regions.
Even though the insider advantage approach explains why the migration of people is
usually a marginal phenomenon, it also points to the fact that actual mobility may have
more important long term effects on regional development. In line with the implications
of traditional migration theory It adds to the explanation why those who move do not
represent the average population. They are usually those who are young, who possess
transferable skills and who are in special life-course situations. Many of them come to
stay, because when they accumulate location-specific insider-advantages, get older
and/or change their family situation, they will soon find it unattractive to move on.
                                                
26 Estimation results are available from the authors on request.
27 The paradox that macro variables have relatively low effects and that for example employment
intensities prove insignificant is valid for the 1989 sample too, though. Note also that the income
difference variable in the 1989 data will partly take up the effect of differences in vacancies-rates for
which no information has been available.33
Attracting people is thus bound to have longer lasting effects on the region of in-
migration through respective changes in demographic composition and skill intensity.
Immobility of people is not (only) a market imperfection but often a necessary condition
for individual utility maximisation and the generation of insider advantage intensive
knowledge. From an individual point of view, immobility is usually an optimal strategy.
Generally, mobility would facilitate macroeconomic regional adjustment in a Monetary
Union and may thus generate some positive externalities. But to the extent that
immobility allows industries to make more efficient use of insider advantage-intensive
knowledge in production and the allocation of leisure time, it is also macroeconomically
efficient.
If insider advantages are related to the behaviour of other residents in the local society,
our insider advantages approach could explain the existence of internationally
sustainable different mobility patterns. In Europe where almost everybody stays insider
advantages are especially relevant. By contrast, in places like the US where it is part of
the dominant culture to be mobile, it ought to be less rewarding to invest in the
accumulation of insider advantages as part of them are at risk when other people and
work mates decide to move away.34
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APPENDIX 1: Data used in the analysis of immobility patterns
in Swedish regional labour markets in 1989 and 1994
Note: All data has been constructed from annonymised data provided by Statistics
Sweden and available from the TOPSWING database, Ume￿ University. People under
investigation concerned individuals aged 19-64 and living for at least one year (before
moving) in a regional labour market.
variables: comment:
stay  1 if stayer, 0 if mover. Movers are people registered as
resident in another labour market region then on the
last of December the year before.
durstay duration of stay: number of months since moving into
the present region of residence, censored at 120 if
never moved.
age in years, according to population register
sex 1=male, 0=female
level  of  education highest level of education completed. Seven levels,
from less than 9 years in school to PhD-level. Classes
1 and 2 = low skilled, 3 to 5 = medium skilled, 5 and 6
= high skilled
profession records from 1990 census, five digit level
sector of occupation records from 1990 census, three digit level
income taxed income from employment and self-employment,
in 100s of 1990 SKr.
income difference difference between annual income before and after the
year of the move, in 1990 SKr.
employed earned more than 50,000 SKr from employment or
self-employment
unemployed earned less than 50,000 SKr and received at least SKr
20,000 in unemployment benefits
out of workforce did neither count as employed nor unemployed
country  of  birth eight groups of countries: Finland, other Nordic,
Western European, Southern European, Former
Yugoslavian, Eastern European, Highly Developed
non-European (Australia, Canada, Japan, New
Zealand, USA), other non-European born
marital status 1= married, 0 otherwise
kids number of children
partner￿s education highest level of education completed (see above)38
partner￿s income taxed income from employment, in 100s of 1990 SKr.
house ownership 1 if owner of detached house, 0 otherwise
became employed  found regular employment during year X
became unemployed  lost regular employment during year X
partner became employed partner found regular employment during year X
partner became unemployed  partner lost regular employment during year X
new  household  built individual moved together with partner with whom
one shares household
household  split  individual moves out of a household shared with
partner
new baby got a child in year X
in  education registered student or participant in other forms of
education
inc.dif.own-prx.  LM difference between average workers￿ income in the
labour market region one was living in at the
beginning of year X and the average workers￿ income
in neighbouring labour market regions￿
workers  inc.  LM  own average income from employment in own labour
market per worker earning at least SKr 50,000 a year
relative  vacancies  rate registered vacancies in per cent of regional labour
force in own labour market relative to the average in
non-neighbouring regional labour markets in the rest
of the country
metropolitan  dummy =1 if resident at the beginning of the year in the
regional labour market of the metropolitan areas
Stockholm, Gothenburg or Malm￿, 0 otherwise.
Further macro variables: further macro variables were constructed for mean income,
income per worker, employment in per cent of total population, vacancies in per cent of
the labour force, occupational specialisation and population density. Also we have put
all variables into proportion to the macro variables for surrounding labour market
regions and for the rest of the country. But as they were strongly correlated, we chose a
few for the final specifications reported here. See the text for further explanations.39
Appendix 2a: Probit Estimation Results
Probability of Staying in 1994 by Age Groups*
(for individuals with duration of stay ≥12 months and full data avail.)
model (3) (3)
group people aged 19-29 people aged 30-64
expl. variable slope b z=b/s.e. marg. b slope b z=b/s.e. marg. b
constant 2,7136 4,65 0,23642 0,8644 2,99 0,86442
age -0,1921 -4,21 -0,01674 0,0108 1,296 0,01080
age squared 0,0042 4,40 0,00036 0,0000 -0,024 0,00000
duration of stay in month 0,0046 8,78 0,00040 0,0071 15,474 0,00709
years since last employer change 0,0110 2,51 0,00096 0,0283 3,223 0,02831
number of prev. moves -0,0363 -2,46 -0,00316 -0,0338 -2,521 -0,03380
years since immigration 0,0093 1,85 0,00081 0,0121 3,139 0,01210
ln(income of partner) 0,0462 5,08 0,00402 0,0372 8,854 0,03724
level of education -0,1635 -18,76 -0,01424 -0,0800 -13,264 -0,08002
migrant*education 0,0792 2,41 0,00690 0,0254 1,64 0,02538
number of children 0,0932 3,55 0,00812 0,0802 6,694 0,08022
married -0,0113 -0,19 -0,00099 0,0543 1,734 0,05430
living in own house 0,0593 1,29 0,00517 0,1768 4,757 0,17680
unemployed -0,1176 -4,96 -0,01024 -0,2902 -12,325 -0,29024
out of labour force -0,0831 -3,22 -0,00724 -0,2547 -10,857 -0,25473
foreign born -0,3923 -3,21 -0,03418 -0,1238 -2,166 -0,12384
inc.dif. own-prx. LM 0,0012 0,61 0,00010 -0,0038 -1,925 -0,00376
workers inc. LM own 0,0108 4,91 0,00094 -0,0004 -0,169 -0,00037
relative vacancies rate -0,1269 -2,12 -0,01105 -0,0058 -0,106 -0,00582
metropolitan dummy 0,2349 8,23 0,02047 0,0606 2,102 0,06062
local share of people in education 3,1508 5,74 0,27450 -0,3359 -0,582 -0,33591
local share of people in industry -0,5584 -3,55 -0,04865 -0,4508 -2,643 -0,45078
become unemployed -0,1177 -5,52 -0,01025 -0,1363 -5,385 -0,13634
partner becomes unemployed -0,0468 -0,57 -0,00408 -0,1516 -3,193 -0,15164
new household built -0,2788 -4,98 -0,02429 -0,2269 -6,769 -0,22692
household split -0,0421 -0,74 -0,00367 -0,3473 -7,678 -0,34734
new baby 0,0735 1,29 0,00640 -0,1670 -3,588 -0,16703




number of observations 102436 183920
*see appendix for further remarks on the definition of variables.
Source: own estimations40
Appendix 2b: Probit Estimation Results
Probability of Staying in 1994 by Employment Status*
(for individuals with duration of stay ≥12 months and full data avail.)
model (3) (3)
group employed  not employed
explanatory  variable slope b z=b/s.e. marginal b slope b z=b/s.e. marginal b
constant -0,1293 -0,47 -0,00202 0,4730 2,34 0,02732
age 0,0377 5,36 0,00059 0,0076 1,59 0,00044
age squared -0,0003 -2,94 0,00000 0,0000 0,71 0,00000
duration of stay in month 0,0082 15,20 0,00013 0,0042 9,54 0,00024
years since last employer change 0,0056 0,74 0,00009 0,0154 3,68 0,00089
number of prev. moves 0,0011 0,07 0,00002 -0,0559 -4,52 -0,00323
years since immigration 0,0174 2,92 0,00027 0,0091 2,63 0,00052
ln(income of partner) 0,0249 3,56 0,00039 0,0425 8,71 0,00245
level of education -0,1300 -17,48 -0,00204 -0,0976 -14,51 -0,00563
migrant*education 0,0336 1,32 0,00053 0,0433 2,56 0,00250
number of children 0,1130 6,77 0,00177 0,0802 5,56 0,00463
married 0,2044 3,97 0,00320 0,0299 0,90 0,00173
living in own house 0,0846 1,89 0,00133 0,1217 3,18 0,00703
unemployed  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -
out of labour force  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 0,0298 1,88 0,00172
foreign born -0,1623 -1,53 -0,00254 -0,2235 -3,75 -0,01291
inc.dif. own-prx. LM -0,0055 -2,61 -0,00009 0,0019 1,09 0,00011
workers inc. LM own 0,0063 2,58 0,00010 0,0047 2,35 0,00027
relative vacancies rate 0,0189 0,27 0,00030 -0,1092 -2,33 -0,00631
metropolitan dummy 0,0860 2,68 0,00135 0,1960 7,52 0,01132
local share of people in education -0,4481 -0,74 -0,00702 2,7641 5,37 0,15963
local share of people in industry -0,7363 -4,07 -0,01153 -0,4266 -2,90 -0,02464
become unemployed -0,4136 -9,31 -0,00648 -0,1074 -5,91 -0,00620
partner becomes unemployed -0,2274 -3,51 -0,00356 -0,0650 -1,21 -0,00375
new household built -0,2785 -6,75 -0,00436 -0,2232 -5,63 -0,01289
household split -0,2350 -4,57 -0,00368 -0,1749 -3,48 -0,01010
new baby -0,1274 -2,28 -0,00199 -0,0089 -0,20 -0,00051




number of observations 137342 149014
*see appendix for further remarks on the definition of variables.
Source: own estimations